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| Crisis in Syria - Implementation of R2P |
Introduction
This article discusses the criticism to the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and more specifically on the debate of its relationship
to State sovereignty. This article is divided into four main parts: the first part discusses the
background of R2P including its pillars and principles, the second part
discusses the different understanding of sovereignty in the context of national
and international relations, the third part explores the debates on R2P and
sovereignty, and last but not least is the conclusion. Overall, I found that criticisms to R2P are mostly
addressed to its imperfect implementation instead of its principles. I argue
that the difference concepts of State sovereignty should not be contested each
other. In addition, R2P should also be understood in a comprehensive approach
by considering all pillars and principles.
Background
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) according to the
2005 UN World Summits, is the responsibility of the international community to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity (UN 2005: 30). There are three pillars of R2P as the guide for
the implementation which agreed by the General Assembly meeting in January
2009, are: State responsibility to protect their populations, the
responsibility of international community to assist states in fulfilling this
responsibility, and the responsibility of international community to use
diplomatic, humanitarian, and other means to protect populations from these
crimes (UN 2009: 10-22). These pillars are nonsequential and are equally
weighted (Bellamy 2010: 143). Moreover, in specific case in which military
intervention need to be implemented, there are six principles that must be
satisfied, i.e: (1) just cause or there must be an extraordinary level of human
rights violations, (2) right intention to stop human suffering, (3)
proportional means, (4) last resort after all non-military options have been
considered, (5) reasonable prospects or likelihood to success, and (6) right
authority from the UN Security Council (Hamilton 2006: 290-291).
R2P and State
Sovereignty: the dilemma of intervention
The conservative meaning of State sovereignty is
related to States’ power over their territories, governance, law, and citizens.
Walker (1988, as cited by Thomson 1995: 213) explores that the debate among
realist and liberal independence about the concept of sovereignty has rescued
the concept from something abstract onto something practical. State
sovereignty, for liberal independence theorists, is defined as State’s power to
control activities and populations within their territory, whereas for
realists, the very meaning of sovereignty is the State’s ability to make
authoritative decisions and it necessarily entails nonintervention as a logical
precondition for the existence of a multiple State system (Thomson 1995:213;
Glanville 2014: 13).
In the context of international relations, the old
meaning of sovereignty has changed and State’s borders have become blurred.
Globalisation and the rise of international laws and treaties, as well as
regional organisations have made the conservative definition of State
sovereignty is no longer the only definition available (Sassen 2005: 535). In
addition, Araujo (2000: 1476) contends that within the framework of
international law, the doctrine of sovereignty cannot be separated from the
relationship between the sovereignty of a State and the sovereignty of peoples.
Therefore, the ability of people to exercise their sovereignty – such as basic
human rights – within a State is crucial.
Moreover, when it comes to R2P, State sovereignty has
completely different meaning. Instead of being a virtue, sovereignty becomes a
responsibility of a State to protect their people. ICISS (2001: 13) argues that
re-characterisation of sovereignty as a control
to sovereignty as responsibility is
needed in both internal and external duties. The UN (2014) defines sovereignty
as a charge of responsibility that holds states accountable for the welfare of
their people and it’s no longer exclusively protects states from external
interference. Therefore, the duty and responsibility to protect populations
from genocide and mass atrocities lie first with the State, but the
international community has a role in preventing genocide and mass atrocities
that cannot be blocked by the invocation of sovereignty (UN 2014).
Criticism
to R2P
Since its adoption in 2005, R2P doctrine has become
part of the diplomatic tools of humanitarian works used by international
organisations, governments, independent commissions, and NGOs to justify
behavior and demand international action (Bellamy 2010: 144). Since then, there
have been many examples of the implementation of R2P. There are at least ten
situations in which R2P has been invoked by UN, State, or coalition of states
(Bellamy 2010: 149-150; Williams and Bellamy 2012: 273). However, intervention in Libya in 2011 was the first and the
only military force operation authorized by UN Security Council through UN
Resolution no. 1973 (Williams and Bellamy 2012: 273).
Despite its implementation in many countries since
more than ten years ago, R2P and its implementation have been criticized by
some countries, scholars, and individuals. The international debates about the
role of R2P in preventing genocide and mass atrocities cannot be separated from
its relation to State sovereignty. Williams and Bellamy (2012: 283) argue that
the debate on the relationship between R2P and State sovereignty usually around
the legality and morality of using military intervention and more specifically
in the absence of UN Security Council authorization. Welsh (2009: 2-3) states
that enshrining the practice of intervening other States’ internal affairs as a
right in international law was strongly opposed but then during the latter part
of 20th century in which international human rights instruments
emerged and vulnerability of civilians increased, the discussion shifted to a
more permissive context.
Advocates of R2P contend that R2P is the best option
available which enables the international community to intervene in a State
when they failed to protect their population from genocide and mass atrocities.
Gareth Evans – one of the originators of R2P – argues that R2P is critically
important to be implemented to prevent states use their sovereignty as “a
license to kill” (Evans 2009: 16). Sovereignty, therefore, should be understood
as “sovereignty to protect” (Deng 2010; Evans 2008: 36-37). In addition,
Caballero-Anthony (2012: 130) contends that R2P is critically important to be
operationalized as a comprehensive and multi-level approach (from international
to grassroots level) to protect civilians despite continuing skepticism from
several countries about pillar three’s implications.
Responding to criticism that R2P breaks State
sovereignty, Power (2009: xi) states that instead of trampling their
sovereignty, R2P was crafted precisely to protect developing countries from
outside interventions by giving national governments the right of first
response. Glaville (2014: 217) argues that conventional account of sovereignty
is no longer applicable in international relations because it neglects the
relationship between sovereignty and responsibility. In addition, Reinold
(2013: 8) points out that sovereignty is not an intrinsic value, it ought to be
conditional and not absolute.
Bellamy (2015: 82-90) gives several positive reasons
why R2P constitutes the most promising way to protect vulnerable populations: First, it commands a global consensus:
R2P can move onto a consensus, and consensus comes legitimacy to create social
pressures needed to push governments to comply with internationally agreed
standards. Second, as R2P grounded in
responsible sovereignty, it can engage States to achieve its goals. Third, R2P provides a clear framework
for action which offers a useful guide to prevent and respond mass atrocities
both a diplomatic tool and a useful guide to action. Fourth, R2P helps make mass atrocity prevention a living reality
when UN member states recognized and approved its pillars and principles by
establishing Office of Genocide Prevention and R2P within the UN. Fifth, R2P challenges the ideologies
that give rise to genocide and mass atrocities, and sixth, R2P calls for a comprehensive partnership for all people and
institutions to mobilise their resources to address the problem of mass
atrocities.
Moreover, a public opinion study in Arica (covering
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, and South Africa) in 2005
concluded that 65 percent of the Africans agreed that UN Security Council has
the right to authorize the use of military interventions to prevent genocide
and mass atrocities (Chalk et al 2012: 41).
On the other hand, critics to R2P rest on several
contentions such as: R2P violates State sovereignty, unclear legal status in
world politics, the use of military intervention and the creation of war,
double standards in its implementation, and abuse of R2P for other State’s
hidden agenda. Moran (2011) states that the new concept of sovereignty as
“responsibility” – instead of “rights” or “control” – was introduced to please
the United States (US) and its allies to intervene other states’ internal
affairs. By changing the meaning of sovereignty from power and control to
responsibility, R2P also weakens State sovereignty.
Loewenstein (2014) gives an example on how R2P has
been misused by Western countries when the UN-authorized military intervention
to Libya succeeded to kill Muammar Gaddafi and change the regime but current
events in which Libya is now divided by civil war and violence is widespread.
The intervention has failed and left the country in a worse situation.
Moreover, Fahim (2014) reports that after the military intervention, the US and
its allies failed to help Libyans achieve either security or democracy. Libyans
have left to uncertain future and endless fights. There are also critics that
R2P has double standards in its implementation. If the aim of R2P is to prevent
genocide and mass atrocities, we never hear the idea from R2P backers implement
R2P in Gaza to protect Palestinians from Israeli missiles (Loewenstein 2014).
There are also criticisms when it comes to the UN,
Holmes (2014) states that one of the weaknesses of R2P is inaccurate
understanding of the role of the UN which is based on the principle of equal
sovereignty of all its members. Moreover, Hamilton (2006: 296-297) argues that
“in principle” R2P has no problem and supported by a range of international
stakeholders, but it has three challenges in the implementation: a lack of
political will, a lack of authorization, and a lack of operational capacity.
These three challenges become the decisive factors to determine whether some
interventions will be succeeded.
Another criticism to R2P is related to the problem of
governance within UN Security Council. As the authorization of the use of
military force is in UN Security Council, in the implementation phase, it will
depend on five – out of 193 countries – permanent members of Security Council
only. Holmes (2014) gives an example that R2P would never come to the US since
they have a veto on the UN Security Council. The different States’ political
interests within the UN Security Council – such as the invocation of R2P in
Libya and not in Rwanda and Syria – also lead to uncertain decisions about the
use or the absence of R2P in the future (Holmes 2014).
When it comes into military force, Williams and
Bellamy (2012) argue that R2P has three main challenges: First, principled disagreement on legal and moral reasons for using
military intervention. This disagreement framed around the issue of
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. Second, political objections: the
objections framed in the political priorities of State’s duties to take care of
their internal matters rather than “saving strangers” and also the objection on
the use of State’s financial resources. Third,
prudential consideration: this objection is mostly related to the assumption
that military intervention is likely to create more harm than good.
Looking at different perspectives on R2P above, it
can be seen that most of the criticism is addressed to its implementation and
not to its pillars and principles. Advocates and opponents of R2P agree that
genocide and mass atrocities should be prevented and people everywhere should
be protected from those crimes. The critics are also targeted specifically to
the third pillar of R2P which gives an opportunity for international community
to intervene State sovereignty without national government’s consent.
In my opinion, R2P should be understood
comprehensively and the discussion of it should beyond the use of military
force. Military force is the last option only if all non-military options have
been considered. R2P was criticised due to its imperfect application in
decision making, problems occurred during its execution and post operation by
using military force. As a result of the imperfect application, R2P is also
being blamed for breaching State sovereignty. Sovereignty as “power” and
“control” and sovereignty as “responsibility” should not be contested each
other in the context of R2P. All pillars of R2P are addressed to strengthen
State sovereignty by giving international assistance if the serious problem
occurred.
Conclusion
As a concept which ranges from national
responsibility and international community assistance to the use of military
force, R2P should be understood in a comprehensive approach. There are view
criticisms addressed to the pillar and principles of R2P. Criticism appears as
a response to narrow understanding and applications of R2P which focus on the
use of military force as it breaches State sovereignty. The narrow application
will lead to the misuse of the concept and create uncertainty in the future.
The next step that should be considered is to have an agreement on how to apply
the pillars and principles in a very complex crisis including the possibility
to reform the structure and governance within the UN Security Council to engage
UN member states in a more inclusive way. *****
Written by: Agung Wasono (May 2016)
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